Reply to Leif Wenar

Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):400-405 (2013)
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Abstract

Explains how a contractualist moral theory can explain the moral phenomena commonly called rights, although it does not appeal to the notion of a right as a basic element of moral thinking, or explain the difference between rights violations and wrongs of other kinds. Argues that the latter failure is not an important fault.

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Citations of this work

Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Obligation: Relational or Second-Personal?Janis David Schaab - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (48).
Putting Wronging First.Daniel Webber - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):734-753.

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