An Aristotelian approach to existential dependence

In Ludger Jansen & Petter Sandstad, Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is a central tenet of (neo-)Aristotelian metaphysics that reality is structured by relations of existential priority or, conversely put, existential dependence: some entities depend for their existence on other entities that help to bring about their existence. After briefly looking at the origins of this idea in Aristotle’s Categories, the chapter examines some contemporary definitions of existential dependence. A notion of existential dependence defined in terms of metaphysical explanation is shown to fulfill numerous Aristotelian desiderata. It is discussed how such explanations can be underwritten by conceptual connections and at the same time be a guide to the priority-structure of non-linguistic reality; finally, the chapter defends the proposed notion of existential dependence against objections from the recent literature.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-11-23

Downloads
37 (#640,129)

6 months
12 (#218,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jonas Werner
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Benjamin Schnieder
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references