Advaita and the philosophy of consciousness without an object

Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 125 (No. 1):146-154 (2020)
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Abstract

The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually impossible.

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Paul Schweizer
University of Edinburgh

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