A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes

In Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. New York: Palgrave. pp. 75-99 (2013)
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Abstract

I argue that to have an attitude is, primarily, (1.) to have a dispositional profile that matches, to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, a stereotype for that attitude, typically grounded in folk psychology, and secondarily, (2.) in some cases also to meet further stereotypical attitude-specific conditions. To have an attitude, on the account I will recommend here, is mainly a matter of being apt to interact with the world in patterns that ordinary people would regard as characteristic of having that attitude. I contrast this view with alternative views that treat having an attitude as a matter of possessing some particular internally stored representational content or some other "deep" structural feature.

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Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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