A Dilemma For Skeptical Theists

Philosophia 50 (4):2113-2123 (2022)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to defend the evidential Argument from Evil from the challenge brought against it by skeptical theists. That challenge is rooted in skeptical theism's assessment that the so-called Noseeum Inference, which is at the heart of the Evidential Argument from Evil, is unsound due to the epistemic gap between God and humans. I will argue that that epistemic gap could be bridged if God were to build the bridge by assisting us to understand his morally sufficient reasons for causing or allowing horrendous suffering of the innocent. I further argue that if God exists, he would be able to assist us, given his omnipotence, and he would want to assist us, given his omnibenevolence manifested in the Summum Bonum for humans. If so, then the soundness of the Noseeum Inference and the Evidential Argument from Evil would be upheld against the epistemic gap challenge from skeptical theists.

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Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil.Stephen J. Wykstra - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 126--50.

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