A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports

Noûs 40 (2):361-368 (2006)
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Abstract

(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms

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10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00614.x

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Stephen Schiffer
New York University

Citations of this work

Specifying Desires.Delia Graff Fara - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):250-272.
Illogical, but rational.David Braun - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):376–379.

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References found in this work

Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Belief ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.

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