A Trilemma about Mental Content

In Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world. Routledge. pp. 272-282 (2013)
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Abstract

Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses reasons for accepting and rejecting each of the three claims. By developing a substantive notion of modes of presentation as constituting nonconceptual content, she argues that the trilemma is best resolved by giving up (C3). In doing so, she discusses the nature of mental content and its relation to bodily skills and conceptual capacities as well as the notion of conceptual and nonconceptual content.

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Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Animal cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
Percepción y mentes animales.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2018 - Revista de Filosofía 43 (2):201-221.
A gramática e os conteúdos da percepção.Daniel Debarry - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).

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