Abstract

The Doctrine of Right is one of Kant’s most disputed works: Defamed as an alleged sign of Kant’s emerging senility by Schopenhauer, it is now considered a classic of both philosophy of right and philosophy of the state. But to this day, even the reliability of the original edition of the Doctrine of Right is an object of learned and heated discussions. According to Martin Heuser’s recently published study Zur Positivität des Rechts in der kritischen Naturrechtslehre Immanuel Kants the whole scholarly disputes on Kant’s Doctrine of Right originate from a complete misunderstanding of the Doctrine’s very methodology, the method of synthetic a priori knowledge. In a critical discussion of Heuser’s book, this paper hence re-reads Kant’s Doctrine of Right. It first takes into consideration some methodological issues with the Doctrine of Right and its interpretation. Afterwards, it investigates the metaphysical character of Kant’s philosophy of right. In a further step, it confronts Kant’s intrapersonal foundation of right with its interpersonal foundation by both Fichte and Hegel. Thereupon, it analyzes the status of private law, the state, and the relation of natural law and positive law in Kant’s Doctrine of Right. The paper ends with a critical examination of Kant’s matrimonial law and his rejection of any right of resistance.