Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):48-64 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.Holly Smith - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.
The problem of mental responsibility: outlines of an ethics of mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - Dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Respecting each other and taking responsibility for our biases.Elinor Mason - 2018 - In Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchison & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oup Usa.
Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.
Collective culpable ignorance.Niels de Haan - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):99-108.
Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill Will.Alisabeth A. Ayars - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-03-09

Downloads
666 (#38,652)

6 months
100 (#61,578)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sebastian Schmidt
University of Zürich

Citations of this work

Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):132-149.
Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.
Social Group Moral Encroachment.Veli Mitova - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):894-911.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.

View all 35 references / Add more references