Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge

Noûs 51 (3):463-483 (2017)
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Abstract

A knowledge-based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem : given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher-order knowledge.

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Citations of this work

Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Mind 133 (531):651-676.
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):939-958.
Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.

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