Abstract

In 1972, Kurt Flasch broke new ground with his contentious thesis that Dietrich von Freiberg, as early as 1300, had formulated a theory of productive subjectivity. Flasch argues that Dietrich recognized the object-constituting function of the mind conceived in transcendental terms, much in the same vein as Immanuel Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding this thesis, Kant has been noticeably neglected in the relevant scholarly discussion. The following paper will address this oversight through a comparative analysis of Dietrich’s and Kant’s theories on mental constitution and intellect. While there are general similarities between the two philosophers, closer inspection reveals critical discrepancies in their core theoretical constructs. Additionally, their respective methodologies are fundamentally incompatible. Dietrich’s approach does offer a reorientation in medieval thinking, yet its underpinnings of metaphysics and theocentricism clash with the experimental nature of Kant’s transcendental refl ections.