Abstract

Among the salient aspects of laughter; I retain its aptitude to administer a kind of punishment – albeit of a relatively mild character. Henri Bergson did not hesitate to adopt for himself the traditional formula that "laughter chastises the ways of life" (Laughter, I.2). I maintain that laughter, seen under this angle, simultaneously conveys an evaluation (commonly a depreciative one) and an immediately implemented punishment. This twofold nature makes of laughter a very specific kind of behavior. The starting point of our approach is the following: as human behavior generally, laughter is itself susceptible of an evaluation. It is of the kind that can be applied to acts of evaluation, and also of the kind that may be applied to punishments. Under the light of this second-order evaluation, laughter may be considered as appropriate or not, as acceptable or not, as deserved or not. This depends principally on the object of laughter. I try to describe some of the norms that are relevant at this second-order level. I also expect such norms to extend their relevance to humor, insofar as it sets out to bring about laughter. The norms that appear at this second-order level (mostly restrictive norms) have a strong social and contextual character. We may describe them without recognizing them as binding. Nevertheless, they do not lack an authority of their own. This is not to say that they are above criticism. There is much to say about humor in ethical and juridical terms. I describe summarily some conflicts of norms that may appear at this second-order level, and claim that there is a dialectical arrangement that best permits to understand how these norms work together.