Honor, Worth, and Justified Revenge in Aristotle

In Krisanna M. Scheiter & Paula Satne, Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment. Switzerland: Springer Nature. pp. 21-35 (2022)
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Abstract

According to Aristotle there may be times when the virtuous person is justified in taking revenge. Many commentators claim that revenge, on Aristotle’s account, aims at restoring the honor and reputation of the avenger, but I will show that this cannot be why the virtuous person seeks revenge. I argue, instead, that the virtuous person seeks revenge when she is slighted in order to prove her worth. Aristotle claims that we slight those we think are neither good nor bad nor capable of producing good or bad things. Although the virtuous person will ignore most slights, Aristotle thinks there may be times when even a virtuous person will have to take revenge in order to prove her worth, not because she is insecure or requires honors, but because she cannot function to the best of her abilities within her society if those she interacts with fail to recognize her worth.

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Valuing Emotions.Michael Stocker & Elizabeth Hegeman - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Elizabeth Hegeman.
Aristotle on Desire.Giles Pearson - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.Jamie Dow - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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