Abstract

Someone is morally motivated precisely when his moral judgment or a moral fact arouses in him the intention to perform an action corresponding to the judgment or fact; we also speak of someone being moved to perform an action because of a moral attitude. For example, Sarah believes that it is moral to donate a portion of her income to solidarity causes, and this belief moves her to donate a certain amount of money to a charity each month. The philosophical question of moral motivation illuminates two fundamental aspects here: First, it aims at analyzing the nature of moral judgments: Do they motivate by themselves or only by reference to a non-cognitive state? Is Sarah's belief that donation is morally required already a motive, or must Sarah additionally desire to donate in order for her judgment to motivate her? Second, the question of moral motivation aims to analyze the relationship between moral judgments and motives: Is it necessary or contingent? Does Sarah's judgment that donating is morally required (possibly in combination with a desire to donate or be moral) necessarily mean that she is morally motivated, or can the motivation be absent?