On what we can ensure

Synthese 162 (1):101 - 115 (2008)
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Abstract

The Conjunction Principle says, roughly, that if the truth of a conjunction can be brought about, then the truth of each conjunct can be brought about. The current essay argues that this principle is not valid. After a clarification of the principle, it is shown how a proper understanding of the involved notions falsify the principle. As a corollary, a recent attack on van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument will be rebutted, because it relies on the invalid conjunction principle.

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Benjamin Schnieder
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Explanation impossible.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):559-576.
The consequence argument ungrounded.Marco Hausmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4931-4950.
Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2021 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (63):375-403.

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References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Causal explanation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-240.
Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.

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