Reasonable But Non-Liberal: Another Route to Polycentrism

Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):218-228 (2021)
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Abstract

In an influential article, Brian Kogelmann argues that a polycentric political order offers an appealing way of reconciling deep diversity with Rawls’ ideal of the well-ordered society. Although I agree with this conclusion, I suggest an amendment to Kogelmann's argument. In particular, his argument abandons the deep diversity that originally motivates the project by stipulating that all citizens will accept liberal political conceptions of justice. I offer an alternative defence of polycentrism, one that shows its ability to achieve the goals of the well-ordered society without assuming that all citizens endorse a liberal political conception.

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Alexander Schaefer
University at Buffalo

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
The Law of Peoples.John Rawls - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):246-253.

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