Two challenges for CI trustworthiness and how to address them

(2017)
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Abstract

We argue that, to be trustworthy, Computa- tional Intelligence (CI) has to do what it is entrusted to do for permissible reasons and to be able to give rationalizing explanations of its behavior which are accurate and gras- pable. We support this claim by drawing par- allels with trustworthy human persons, and we show what difference this makes in a hypo- thetical CI hiring system. Finally, we point out two challenges for trustworthy CI and sketch a mechanism which could be used to gener- ate sufficiently accurate as well as graspable rationalizing explanations for CI behavior.

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Author Profiles

Kevin Baum
German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence
Eva Schmidt
TU Dortmund

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References found in this work

Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya, Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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