What shifts? : Thresholds, standards, or alternatives?

In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Much of the extant discussion focuses on the question of whether contextualism resolves skeptical paradoxes. Understandably. Yet there has been less discussion as to the internal structure of contextualist theories. Regrettably. Here, for instance, are two questions that could stand further discussion: (i) what is the linguistic basis for contextualism and (ii) what is the parameter that shifts with context?

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,459

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
415 (#69,953)

6 months
6 (#891,985)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

View all 24 references / Add more references