Reason and Happiness

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:139-161 (1974)
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Abstract

Are moral judgements objective? This is a question of great complexity, and in what follows I shall try to cast some light on what it means, and on how it might be answered

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Roger Scruton
Last affiliation: University of Buckingham

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References found in this work

How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.
Prescriptive Language.R. M. Hare - 1952 - In Richard Mervyn Hare (ed.), The Language of Morals. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Hypothetical Imperative.Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):429-450.

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