Abstract

It is not an easy work to read, the phrasing being rather complicated, and the topics at times repetitious and intertwined; but great works do not have to be easy texts. It is the first of a proposed pair, its role being indicated by the sub-title: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. The next volume is to deal with the analysis of scientific concepts and inference. In the present work we may distinguish three groups of chapters. The first group centers around certain structural concepts, particularly science, explanation and law. The second concerns problems of the physical sciences and the third is about social and biological sciences. It is entirely absurd to attempt a thorough review of the whole work in less than a work of comparable length particularly in view of the highly technical character of substantial parts of it. Another reviewer has already decided on the same grounds to restrict his attention to the second part. I shall concentrate on the first and third. I am particularly sensible that the comments which follow, when critical, are reflections of an alternative possible construal rather than objective demonstrations of error.