Rand and Rescher on Truth

Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (1):41 - 48 (2006)
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Abstract

This essay argues that Rand's conception of truth marshals all the strengths of the four theories of truth detailed by philosopher Nicholas Rescher: correspondence, coherence, intuitionistic, and pragmatic

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