Curry's paradox in contractionless constructive logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):135 - 150 (1996)
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Abstract

We propose contractionless constructive logic which is obtained from Nelson's constructive logic by deleting contractions. We discuss the consistency of a naive set theory based on the proposed logic in relation to Curry's paradox. The philosophical significance of contractionless constructive logic is also argued in comparison with Fitch's and Prawitz's systems

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Citations of this work

Natural deduction and Curry's paradox.Susan Rogerson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.
Natural deduction systems for Nelson's paraconsistent logic and its neighbors.Norihiro Kamide - 2005 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 15 (4):405-435.

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