Epistemic agency: Some doubts

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198 (2013)
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Abstract

Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.

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Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Thing causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):1050-1072.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

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