Abstract

A major reason for the emergence of naturalism in philosophy of science in recent years is the rejection of the idea of a priori principles to which science must conform. A naturalistic attitude also underlies the new developments in sociology of science. Traditional sociologists of science believed that the cognitive content of science was beyond their rightful scope. The new sociologists challenge this premise, arguing for the legitimacy of a sociological study of scientific knowledge. They offer an alternative approach to traditional epistemological issues. This has resulted in a debate between philosophers and sociologists. The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. The first is to examine the issues underlying the debate between naturalist philosophers of science and sociologists of scientific knowledge. The second is to understand the relationship between the two disciplines. ;The second chapter critically examines Laudan's rationalist account of science. He rejects the traditionalist rationalism and the relativism of Kuhn and attempts to establish a position which can avoid the problems that beset these viewpoints. This middle position, I argue, is not viable. The third chapter is concerned with the central claims made by the Edinburgh strong programmers. I discuss and criticize the import of their relativist-symmetrical approach and also their instrumentalism. My argument is that the interest explanation is inadequate because it ignores constraints offered by the natural world. The fourth chapter is a discussion of the issues underlying the debate between naturalist philosophers and sociologists of knowledge. I examine the treatment accorded by both sides to nature, human nature and society in their accounts of science and criticize Giere's normative naturalism. The fifth chapter deals with relativist, constructivist and discourse-analytic trends in the sociology of knowledge. I criticize their anti-realist stance. The sixth chapter is a critical examination of Latour's actor-network model of science and technology which aims to go beyond the rationalist and relativist views discussed earlier. Finally, I examine the relation between philosophy and sociology of science and conclude that fundamental differences remain between them, despite efforts by some philosophers to reconcile these differences