Falsification and refutation

Abstract

A scientific theory, according to Popper, can be legitimately saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis to generate new, falsifiable predictions. Also, if there are suspicions of bias or error, the researchers might introduce an auxiliary falsifiable hypothesis that would allow testing. But this technique can not solve the problem in general, because any auxiliary hypothesis can be challenged in the same way, ad infinitum. To solve this regression, Popper introduces the idea of ​​a basic statement, an empirical statement that can be used both to determine whether a given theory is falsifiable and, if necessary, to corroborate falsification assumptions. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22162.09923

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Nicolae Sfetcu
Romanian Academy

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl R. Popper - 1935 - London, England: Routledge.
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.
The propensity interpretation of probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.

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