Lakatos on Dogmatic Falsificationism

Abstract

Dogmatic (naturalist) falsificationism accepts the falsifiability of all scientific theories without qualification but preserves an infallible empirical basis. He is strictly empiric without being inductivist: he denies the fact that certainty of the empirical basis can be conveyed to theories. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest mark of justification. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15196.33927

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Nicolae Sfetcu
Romanian Academy

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