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Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?
Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2):215-226 (2021)
Abstract
This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken the factivity condition such that knowledge implies approximate truth.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):263-282.
Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (2):207-215.
Addressing two recent challenges to the factive account of knowledge.Esther Goh & Frederick Choo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (435):1-14.
The KK Principle and the Strong Notion of Knowledge: Hintikka’s Arguments for KK Revisited.Chen Bo - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-17.
References found in this work
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.
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