Do Not Claim Too Much: Second-order Logic and First-order Logic

Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):42-64 (1998)
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to delimit what can and cannot be claimed on behalf of second-order logic. The starting point is some of the discussions surrounding my Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Secondorder Logic.

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reprint Shapiro, Stewart (1999) "Do not claim too much: Second-order logic and first-order logic". Philosophia Mathematica 7(1):42-64

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Higher-Order Logic or Set Theory: A False Dilemma.S. Shapiro - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):305-323.
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Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University

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