Hypokeimenon vs. Substance

Review of Metaphysics 74 (294):227-250 (2020)
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Abstract

Aristotle’s concept of subject, or hypokeimenon, has been understudied in scholarship, in part because, since Aristotle associates it with his concept of ousia or substance, discussion of hypokeimenon is often eclipsed by that of substance. It is often thought that Aristotle introduces hypokeimenon as the criterion for being a substance in his Categories. In this essay I argue that he does not, thus calling into question some entrenched views about Aristotelian substance. Divorcing hypokeimenon from substance in this way emphasizes the need for an account of hypokeimenon in its own right. In this essay I also begin this work by using an often overlooked pointer in Categories towards a discussion in An. Po., in whose context Aristotle's logical notion of hypokeimenon begins to become more clear.

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Keren Shatalov
Clemson University

Citations of this work

Categories and foundational ontology: A medieval tutorial.Luis M. Augusto - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (1):1-56.
Aristotle on Non-substantial Particulars, Fundamentality, and Change.Keren Wilson Shatalov - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (4):723-753.

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