Nomothetic Mythology of Propositional Attitudes

Abstract

Physical translation of a mental content must involve a set of causal antecedents A and a set of causal consequents B which instantiate properties that figure in strict laws as antecedent and consequent conditions respectively. Only if there are double-role events in common between A and B capable of migrating to purely A or to purely B in future depending on the role that the mental content play then, psychological anomalism can be established but without any need to give up the type-identity of mental and physical events. This paper argues that belief and desire are explanatorily inextricable likewise.

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Anomalous monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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