Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology

Abstract

A central controversy in philosophy of psychology pits reductionists against, for lack of a better term, autonomists. The reductionist’s burden is to show that psychology is, at best, merely a heuristic device for describing phenomena that are, when speaking more precisely, just physical. I say “at best,” because reductionists are prone to less conciliatory remarks, such as: “psychological property P just is physical property N, so scientific explanation might as well focus exclusively on N,” and “psychological property P is nothing other than N, so generalizations about N suffice to say all that there is to say about P,” and “knowledge of all the N facts suffices for knowledge of all the P facts.”.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,203

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
7 (#1,667,656)

6 months
7 (#469,699)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lawrence Shapiro
University of Wisconsin, Madison

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references