- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Three Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance
Logos and Episteme 2 (1):117-125 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that three of the most prominent theories of conditional acceptance face very serious problems. David Lewis' concept of imaging, the Ramsey test and Jonathan Bennett's recent hybrid view all face viscious regresses, or they either employ unanalyzed components or depend upon an implausibly strong version of doxastic voluntarism.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
Completeness for counter-doxa conditionals – using ranking semantics.Eric Raidl - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):861-891.
Difference-making conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-39.
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.Robert Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis‐Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
An analysis of disposition concepts by the Ramsey test.Holger Andreas - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11379-11397.
Acceptance and Certainty, Doxastic Modals, and Indicative Conditionals.Kurt Norlin - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):951-971.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-02-11
Downloads
485 (#59,144)
6 months
104 (#57,377)
2011-02-11
Downloads
485 (#59,144)
6 months
104 (#57,377)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Integrating Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (2):1-18.
Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Rodríguez Xavier de Donato, Bonilla Jesús Zamora & Javier González De Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-7qg25 dc2