Abstract

I treat the nihilism in Nietzsche's thought from within the Christianity and Platonism he rejected, challenging his finding that reality contains no transcendent truth and is not fundamentally good. But I embrace his voluntarism and genealogical method. I also believe he is right about the duplicity in religion, morality, and theoretical thought, in which people seek transcendence while exercising the will to power. But Nietzsche's criticisms do not apply to genuine Christianity, which explains his experience better than he explains it. ;I first give a theologically conservative but not literal treatment of the fall of humanity, from Genesis 1-3. I show how humanity could have entered history from an animal background and found itself in the fallen condition. Nihilism exists from the beginning, but it is the view from within fallen reason, not a good description of reality, and it is caused by humanity's hiding from transcendence. I end Part One looking at how reason fails to understand the conditions of its origin. A particular effect of this is the kind of nihilism known as "value-free thought." ;Part Two employs Nietzsche's critique of rationality and connects it to Heidegger's "technicity" and the biblical "idolatry." I then consider problems in the interpretation of Nietzsche, in particular the idea that he holds a correspondence view of truth. I argue that he should be understood as "epistemically pessimistic," knowing that knowledge cannot do what it sets out to do. The correspondence view of truth exists because Nietzsche is making a negative value statement about the unknowability of reality. Finally, I present Nietzsche as one who "completes the fall," which means he attempts to become truly independent of transcendence. But I argue that he reveals fallenness more than he overcomes it. His "Zarathustran hope" is unable to overcome nihilism