Truth and Scientific Change

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394 (2017)
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Abstract

The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?

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10.1007/s10838-017-9370-3

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Gila Sher
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws.Gila Sher - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3945-3974.
Logical Realism: A Tale of Two Theories.Gila Sher - 2024 - In Sophia Arbeiter & Juliette Kennedy (eds.), The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy. Springer.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

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