Amplifying personal probability theory: Comments on L. J. Savage's "difficulties in the theory of personal probability"

Philosophy of Science 34 (4):326-332 (1967)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Professor Savage has been candid and generous in stating his interest in philosophy, and the philosophers who have heard him are surely grateful for this. His attitude is very far from that of some competent scientists and mathematicans who purport to clear up the questions which philosophers raise concerning their disciplines by means of a battery of technical results of varying relevance—a procedure which can often be appropriately described as “an abominable snow-job.” However, Professor Savage's generosity places a responsibility on philosophers, since the questions he raises are difficult.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,314

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
78 (#277,905)

6 months
6 (#572,300)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Theories and the transitivity of confirmation.Mary Hesse - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.I. J. Good - 1950 - Philosophy 26 (97):163-164.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl R. Popper, Julius Freed & Lan Freed - 1961 - Philosophy of Science 28 (3):319-324.

Add more references