Asymmetric Personal Identity

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):127-146 (2018)
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Abstract

Personal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity---such as memory and anticipation---are asymmetric and "count in favor of personal identity from one side only". Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.

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Theodore Sider
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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