Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?

Analysis 51 (4):265 - 271 (1991)
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Abstract

Act Utilitarianisms divide into Total and Average versions. Total versions seem to imply Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”. Average versions are proposed in part to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but these are subject to “Mere Addition” arguments as detailed by Hudson in “The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People”. Thus, various intermediate versions of utilitarianism, such as the one investigated by Hurka in “Value and Population Size”, take on interest. But Hudson argues that such compromise theories are subject to the mere addition arguments, and are therefore no improvement over Average Utilitarianism. I disagree: some such compromise solutions escape Hudson’s Mere Addition arguments.

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Theodore Sider
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Value and population size.Thomas Hurka - 1982 - Ethics 93 (3):496-507.
The diminishing marginal value of happy people.James L. Hudson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):123 - 137.

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