Abstract

The purpose of this article is to discuss the terms of representation and the theory of authorization in Hobbes, highlighting, in turn, the adversities and inconsistencies in the way the fictitious attribution interferes with the constitution of authority in Hobbes. In this sense, it becomes necessary to discuss the way in which Hobbes determines the function of the representative in the absence of his identification as author, that is, without any condition to attribute authority to his actors. This is, therefore, a contradiction in terms of the rationality imposed by the model of representation proposed by Hobbes, in which the imputation of responsibility, in the case of the fictitious person, is absent of responsibility for his acts and, thus, making it impossible to assume responsibility for the acts of another. To this end, the aspects of the fictitious person and his relationship with the precepts of unauthorized authorization are highlighted in order to define the terms of the fictitious attribution and its implications in the legal theory of authorization in Hobbes.