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Being Rational and Being Right, by Juan Comesaña
Mind 131 (523):1005-1015 (2022)
Abstract
Understandably, Tomás is disappointed—but was he irrational in acting as he did? Juan Comesaña’s answer is: obviously not. According to Comesaña, Tomás’s action.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.
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