Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459 (2018)
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Abstract

Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust.

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Thomas W. Simpson
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Trust and sincerity in art.C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:21-53.
Trusting in order to inspire trustworthiness.Michael Pace - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11897-11923.
Trust and Contingency Plans.Lee-Ann Chae - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):689-699.

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References found in this work

Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.

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