Abstract

Rejections of Hume’s account of agency as ‘implausible’ and ‘defective’ have not been uncommon in recent commentary, but these responses have been elaborated without acknowledgement that Maine de Biran offered a critique of the Scottish philosopher on this point two centuries earlier. In criticizing Hume, Biran argues that awareness of the power of the will in effort, understood as the relation of will to resistance, is the fundamental fact of all consciousness. This article revisits Biran's critique in the light of a recent defence of Hume and with reference to the first Enquiry's crucial footnote denying that effort can ground the idea of causal power. The article also addresses one of the background motivations for Hume’s sceptical account of agency to which Biran does not respond directly, namely what the first Enquiry presents as the ‘inconsistency’ of the idea of free will as a power removed from all causal determination. I conclude by arguing that Biran cannot offer an adequate response to Hume on this point, and that a fuller, more compelling response can be found in the development of the French spiritualist tradition.