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Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism
In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 169–173 (2011)
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Quine's two dogmas of empiricism intuitive difference between two claims “analytic” truth and second “synthetic” truth, empirical facts “Two Dogmas”, Quine's concern explicating distinction two expressions, synonymous, sentences remaining true analytic–synthetic distinction philosophers influenced by logical empiricism critical responses to Quine's circularity argument against analyticity extensional languages
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