Abstract

In the De Anima, Aristotle repeatedly claims that our intellect , or some component of our intellect, is separable from the body. But it is not initially clear what these claims amount to. They could be taken to mean that nous is extensionally separable or that it is logically separable . The aim of this study is to assess Aristotle's position on the relation between our nous and the body. The main question is whether nous is ontologically separable from the body. I begin by showing why that study of perception and imagination is a pre-requisite for the study of nous. The study of aisthesis is especially important since on one prominent interpretation Aristotle is said to hold that aisthesis does not involve material alteration within the body. This view suggests that nous has neither necessary nor sufficient somatic conditions, since Aristotle thinks that nous is less bodily than aisthesis. So the view can be taken to imply that nous is ontologically separable. I argue that aisthesis must involve material alteration . I also argue that episodes of human thought require the use of images and that this requires material alteration within the primary organ of perception. Thus, episodes of thought require material alteration and our nous cannot be ontologically separable. However, in De Anima III.5 Aristotle discusses the material and efficient causes of thought: passive intellect and active intellect. I show that active intellect is for Aristotle ontologically separable: existing, after the death of the body, as an active readiness to actualize potential objects of thought. I also show that potential intellect perishes with the body . Thus, I conclude that for Aristotle one component of human nous is ontologically separable from the body