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Chaos in game dynamics
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130 (1992)
Abstract
Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a strange attractor does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological modelsAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Darwin meets the logic of decision: Correlation in evolutionary game theory.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
Spatialization and Greater Generosity in the Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1996 - Biosystems 37:3-17.
Evolutionary game theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Interpersonal dependency of preferences.Julian Nida-Rümelin, Thomas Schmidt & Axel Munk - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):257-280.
An Introduction to Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary Game Dynamics. [REVIEW]Francisco Franchetti & William H. Sandholm - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):167-178.
References found in this work
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.Reinhard Selten - 1975 - International Journal of Game Theory 4 (1):25-55.
Metatickles and the dynamics of deliberation.Ellery Eells - 1984 - Theory and Decision 17 (1):71-95.
Ratifiability and the Logic of Decision1.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):44-56.
Deliberational dynamics and the foundations of bayesian game theory.Brian Skyrms - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:345-367.
Correlated equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):347 - 364.
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