Return of the Liar: Three-Valued Logic and the Concept of Truth

American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (2):153-161 (1970)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,888

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

An alternative to Brian Skyrms' approach to the Liar.Paul Vincent Spade - 1976 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (1):137-146.
The liar paradox and many-valued logic.S. V. Bhave - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):465-479.
Introduction.Brad Armendt & Kevin Zollman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):1-5.
The concept of truth.Boris Čulina - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):339 - 360.
Truth, the Liar, and Tarski's Semantics.Gila Sher - 2002 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 143–163.
Four valued semantics and the liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.
Three-valued logic and future contingents.A. N. Prior - 1953 - Philosophical Quarterly 3 (13):317-326.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
67 (#314,715)

6 months
9 (#482,469)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references