The structure of radical probabilism

Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297 (1996)
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Abstract

Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.

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Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.
Radical probabilism and bayesian conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

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