How to Distinguish Good and Bad Arguments: Dialogico-Rhetorical Normativity

Argumentation 16 (2):179-196 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Deductivism is not merely a logical technique, but also a theory of normativity: it provides an objective and universal standard of evaluation. Contemporary dialectical logic rejects deductive normativity, replacing its universal standard by an intersubjective standard. It is argued in this paper that dialectical normativity does not improve upon deductive normativity. A dialogico-rhetorical alternative is proposed.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,154

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-24

Downloads
39 (#568,940)

6 months
5 (#1,015,253)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - Newport News, Va.: Vale Press.
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca - 1969 - Notre Dame, IN, USA: Notre Dame University Press. Edited by Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
Philosophy of Logics.Susan Haack - 1978 - London and New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 13 references / Add more references