The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument

Philosophical Review 107 (3):465 (1998)
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Abstract

The main target of The Kinds of Things is the Lockean-Humean view of personal identity that had its most controversial expression in Parfit and that so thoroughly shaped the debate on the issue. Doepke develops an alternative Kantian-Aristotelian account of personal identity, partly by analyzng the demerits of the Lockean-Humean view. While locating itself in the landscape of the traditional debate, though, the book is very atypical of it.

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Marc Slors
Radboud University Nijmegen

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