On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox

Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169 (2016)
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Abstract

There are circumstances in which we want to predict a series of interrelated events. Faced with such a prediction task, it is natural to consider logically inconsistent predictions to be irrational. However, it is possible to find cases where an inconsistent prediction has higher expected accuracy than any consistent prediction. Predicting tournaments in sports provides a striking example of such a case and I argue that logical consistency should not be a norm of rational predictions in these situations

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Rory Smead
Northeastern University

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