Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief

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Dialectica 66 (3):305-308 (2012)
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10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01306.x

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Author Profiles

Philip A. Ebert
University of Stirling
Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The role of pretense in the process of self-deception.Xintong Wei - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):1-14.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1986 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.
Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.

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